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introduction: Contact tracing is a critical strategy required for timely prevention and 
control of Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreaks. Available evidence suggests that poor 
contact tracing was a driver of the EVD outbreak in West Africa, including Sierra Leone. 
In this article, we answered the question as to whether EVD contact tracing, as practiced 
in Western Area (WA) districts of Sierra Leone from 2014 to 2015, was effective. The 
goal is to describe contact tracing and identify obstacles to its effective implementation.
Methods: Mixed methods comprising secondary data analysis of the EVD case and 
contact tracing data sets collected from WA during the period from 2014 to 2015, key 
informant interviews of contact tracers and their supervisors, and a review of available 
reports on contact tracing were implemented to obtain data for this study.
results: During the study period, 3,838 confirmed cases and 32,706 contacts were 
listed in the viral hemorrhagic fever and contact databases for the district (mean 8.5 
contacts per case). Only 22.1% (852) of the confirmed cases in the study area were 
listed as contacts at the onset of their illness, which indicates incomplete identification 
and tracing of contacts. Challenges associated with effective contact tracing included 
lack of community trust, concealing of exposure information, political interference with 
recruitment of tracers, inadequate training of contact tracers, and incomplete EVD case 
and contact database. While the tracers noted the usefulness of community quarantine 
in facilitating their work, they also reported delayed or irregular supply of basic needs, 
such as food and water, which created resistance from the communities.
Abbreviations: CDC, US Centers for Disease Control; EVD, Ebola virus disease; MOHS, Ministry of Health and Sanitation; 
VHF, viral hemorrhagic fever; WA, Western Area.
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inTrODUcTiOn
Sierra Leone experienced a major, unprecedented outbreak of 
Ebola virus disease (EVD) from early 2014 to late 2015. With 
a total of 8,704 confirmed cases (accounting for 57% of all 
confirmed cases in West Africa), 3,589 deaths from confirmed 
cases and a case fatality rate of 41.2%,1 the country was clas-
sified as having intense transmission of EVD. All districts in 
Sierra Leone were affected by the outbreak at various times. The 
Western Area (WA), one of the four administrative divisions 
of Sierra Leone, which encompasses urban and rural districts, 
the most populated of the 14 administrative districts in Sierra 
Leone, experienced intense transmission of EVD between June 
2014 and August 2015, when the last confirmed case died at 
the Ebola treatment center (1). The district accounted for an 
estimated 40% of all confirmed cases reported in Sierra Leone 
during the outbreak.2
WA has a landmass of 557 km2 and an estimated population 
of 1,304,507.3 It is subdivided into 49 urban and 20 rural wards. 
It is the main economic and financial center of the country, and 
therefore it has a transient population, with a high influx of people 
from rural communities from all parts of the country arriving in 
search of economic opportunities and better living standards. The 
area has several urban slums and informal trading (and fishing) 
settlements, which are densely populated and have poor living 
conditions.
EVD is a highly infectious zoonotic disease caused by the 
Ebola virus. Primary infection occurs when infected animals, 
such as fruit bats and non-human primates, transmit the disease 
to humans, while secondary transmission is human-to-human, 
through close contact with body fluids of a sick person, body 
of a deceased patient, or contaminated environments (2, 3). The 
pattern in Sierra Leone, including in WA, was human-to-human 
1 Ebola Situation Report  –  (16 December 2015). WHO (2015) http://apps.who.
int/ebola/current-situation/ebola-situation-report-16-december-2015 [Accessed 
December 23, 2015].
2 Government of Sierra Leone, Ministry of Health and Sanitation Ebola Virus 
Disease Situation Report (Sit-Rep) – 21 December 2015. MOHS. (2015) http://nerc.
sl/sites/default/files/Ebola%20Situation%20Report_Vol%20572.pdf [Accessed on 
December 23, 2015].
3 Ministry of Health and Sanitation, Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone Demographic and 
Household Survey 2013. MOHS. (2013) http://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR297/
FR297.pdf [Accessed on April 8, 2016].
transmission. Because of the mode of transmission, the World 
Health Organization (WHO) recommends contact tracing as one 
of the critical interventions for prevention and control of EVD 
during outbreaks.
Contact tracing involves systematic identification and record-
ing of all persons exposed to a symptomatic Ebola patient (clas-
sified as a probable or confirmed case), their infected body fluids 
or corpse, and monitoring them daily for EVD symptoms for a 
period of 21 days, from the last day of exposure.4 Contact tracing 
during outbreaks of EVD, coupled with active case search and 
alert, case investigation, laboratory testing, and database analysis, 
constitutes the surveillance and epidemiological investigation 
component of the EVD control strategy (see text footnote 3). The 
principles of contact tracing are based on the premise that during 
outbreaks of EVD, secondary chains and other new cases nor-
mally arise from contact with infected patients (see text footnote 
3). Therefore, contact tracing ensures that all exposed persons, 
who are likely to develop symptoms of the diseases, are monitored 
daily during the incubation period, and those who become symp-
tomatic are immediately isolated, therefore breaking the chain of 
transmission (see text footnote 3). Other EVD control measures 
include isolation, management and treatment of patients, strict 
infection prevention and control, safe and dignified burial of the 
dead, and community mobilization and engagement (4–6).
Recent scientific evidence suggests that the intense transmis-
sion of EVD, the prolonged duration of the outbreak, and the 
high case load in the West Africa outbreak are, to some extent, 
due to poor contact tracing (7, 8). Anecdotal evidence also 
attributed the high caseload and inability to promptly contain 
the outbreak to a high population density, overcrowding, highly 
mobile populations, and several unregistered informal settle-
ments, which could have provided fertile ground for sustained 
transmission of the disease (9). These factors further complicated 
effective contact tracing and overall outbreak prevention and 
control.
In this study, we describe contact tracing as it was performed 
in an urban area of Sierra Leone, from June 2014 to August 
2015. We answered the research question as to whether contact 
4 World Health Organization. Contact tracing during an outbreak of Ebola virus 
disease. Brazzaville: WHO. (2014) http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publica-
tions/ebola/contact-tracing-during-outbreak-of-ebola.pdf?ua=1 [Accessed on 
December 23, 2015].
conclusion: Multiple gaps in contact tracing attributed to a variety of factors associated 
with implementers, and communities were identified as obstacles that impeded timely 
control of the EVD outbreak in the WA of Sierra Leone. In future outbreaks, early com-
munity engagement and participation in contact tracing, establishment of appropriate 
mechanisms for selection, adequate training and supervision of qualified contact tracers, 
establishment of a well-managed and complete contact tracing database, and provision 
of basic needs to quarantined contacts are recommended as measures to enhance 
effective contact tracing.
Keywords: ebola virus disease, outbreak response, contact tracing, surveillance, Western area, sierra leone, 
research article
TaBle 1 | Definition of suspected, probable, and confirmed cases of eVD 
in Western area districts, sierra leone: June 2014 to august 2015.1
case Definition
Suspected A suspected Ebola patient is any person presenting with 
acute fever (>38°C) and three or more of the following 
symptoms:
•	 Headache
•	 Loss of appetite
•	 Fatigue
•	 Difficulty breathing
•	 Nausea
•	 Difficulty swallowing
•	 Vomiting
•	 Hiccups
•	 Diarrhea
•	 Muscle or joint pain
•	 Abdominal pain
•	 Unexplained bleeding
OR anyone who is ill and either:
Cared for or was cared for by someone who had Ebola,
Attended a funeral of someone with Ebola,
In the case of a child, breastfed by a confirmed Ebola mother 
or caretaker
OR any unexplained death
Probable Any person meeting the suspected case definition criteria and 
has had contact (epidemiological link) with a confirmed case
OR any unexplained death
Confirmed A probable or suspected case whose laboratory test is 
positive for Ebola virus
1 Case definition recommendations for Ebola or Marburg virus diseases. WHO. 
(2014) http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/146397/1/WHO_EVD_CaseDef_ 
14.1_eng.pdf?ua=1 [Accessed on May 16, 2016].
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tracing as performed in WA was effective or not, and what were 
the associated issues and challenges during the study period? The 
objectives of the study were to understand the characteristics, 
effectiveness, and challenges of contact tracing in WA and to 
propose appropriate recommendations for improving EVD 
contact tracing during future outbreaks, with a focus on urban 
settings.
MaTerials anD MeThODs
study Design
We conducted a descriptive study of the EVD contact tracing 
activities that were implemented from June 2014 to August 
2015 in WA, Sierra Leone. A mixed methods approach was 
used, including secondary data analysis, key informant 
interviews, and a review of existing reports. Secondary data 
analysis was conducted on the EVD case and contact trac-
ing data for WA, generated as part of the epidemiological 
investigations during the 2014/2015 EVD outbreak response. 
Key informant interviews, which sought to establish facts 
on the implementation, evolution, and challenges associated 
with implementing contact tracing activities, were conducted 
with key persons, including contact tracers and contact trac-
ing supervisors, who were directly or indirectly involved in 
contact tracing activities. We also reviewed available reports 
on contact tracing in WA.
Data collection and analyses
In Sierra Leone, active EVD case search and identification as 
well as the identification and listing of contacts were aided by 
the use of standardized EVD case definitions, categorized into 
suspect, probable, and confirmed cases (Table 1), and a standard-
ized definition for an EVD contact. A contact was defined as “a 
person who undertook unprotected care for a patient of Ebola or 
participated in the burial of an Ebola death or washed linen, bathed 
a patient, cleaned body fluids of a case or slept in the same room 
with a case.”5
Case investigation and contact tracing forms are completed 
for every suspected or probable case of EVD investigated by the 
alert and response team, which comprise district surveillance 
officers and data clerks. The cases are then transferred to EVD 
holding centers/community care centers (CCC), where blood 
samples are taken and sent to the laboratory for testing. A copy 
of the case investigation form accompanies the blood sample 
to the laboratory, where a laboratory identification number 
is assigned. Once the laboratory results are received, the case 
investigation and contact tracing forms are updated accord-
ingly and then entered into the viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF) 
software, which was developed by the United States Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)6 by district data clerks. 
5 Emergency guideline: implementation and management of contact tracing 
for Ebola virus disease. WHO/CDC. (2015) http://apps.who.int/iris/bit-
stream/10665/185258/1/WHO_EVD_Guidance_Contact_15.1_eng.pdf?ua=1 
[Accessed on March 4, 2016].
6 The Epi Info Viral Haemorrhagic Fever Software. CDC. (2015) https://epiinfovhf.
codeplex.com/ [Accessed on February 2, 2016 and May 5, 2016].
All districts of the country share their data with the national 
EVD data management center in Freetown, who then aggregates 
them into a national database on a daily basis. Case and contact 
data are linked using unique case identification numbers in the 
EVD database.
For this study, we extracted all datasets for WA from the 
national EVD database that met the confirmed EVD case defini-
tion and all contacts for the period from June 2014 to August 
2015. The data were cleaned and exported to Microsoft Excel, 
where descriptive analysis was conducted. The total number of 
confirmed cases and contacts, number of confirmed cases with 
linked contacts, number of contacts linked to the confirmed 
cases, and mean number of contacts per case were generated in 
the first stage of the analysis. In the second stage, we described 
the sociodemographic and epidemiological characteristics of 
contacts who were linked to cases in terms of place, person, time, 
relationship to case, and type of exposure.
Key informant interviews were conducted to generate qualita-
tive data. A key informant interview guide, which explained the 
purpose of the study, objectives of the key informant interviews, 
selection criteria, and profile of interviewees, the interview pro-
cess, and guiding questions, was developed. The interview guide 
had five main themes, which explored the field experiences of 
the contact tracers/surveillance officers, successes, challenges, 
TaBle 2 | summary of confirmed eVD cases and contacts and related 
indicators in Western area districts, sierra leone: June 2014 to august 2015.
Urban (%) rural (%) aggregated 
totals (%)
Total number of confirmed 
cases
2,495 (65.0) 1,343 (35.0) 3,838
Proportion of confirmed cases 
who were listed as contacts 
at the time of their illness
519 (20.8) 333 (24.8) 852 (22.1)
Total number of contactsa 16,319 (63.9) 9,232 (36.1) 32,706 
Number of confirmed cases 
with linked contacts in 
databaseb
424 (17.0) 282 (21.0) 714 (18.6)
Number of contacts linked to 
confirmed casesc
9,726 (59.6) 3,167 (34.3) 16,042 (49.0)
Mean number of contacts 
per case
23 11 22 (8.5)
a7,155 records without residence excluded from the analysis for Western area urban 
and rural.
bEight records without address excluded from the analysis for Western area urban and 
rural.
c3,194 records with missing address excluded from the analysis for Western area urban 
and rural.
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ways forward for improving contact tracing, and usefulness of 
quarantine to contact tracing. The research team used a purposive 
sampling method to identify five contact tracers and five contact 
tracer supervisors from a list of contact tracers in WA. The selec-
tion criteria ensured a good mix of interviewees in terms of age, 
gender, and educational level. The key informant interview was 
administered by members of the research team. The responses 
were coded, organized by thematic area, and summary counts 
generated for each thematic area.
We also obtained and conducted desk reviews on daily and 
weekly epidemiological bulletins for WA and other relevant avail-
able field investigation reports and extracted relevant information 
pertaining to contact tracing in WA.
ethical considerations
This study was conducted as part of the post-outbreak review of 
the outbreak response to provide evidence for improving contact 
tracing and EVD surveillance during future outbreaks. Ministry 
of Health and Sanitation (MOHS) and the WA district health 
management team approved the study, and informed consent 
was obtained from all the key informant interviewees. All data 
presented in this article are anonymous.
resUlTs
The first case (and contacts) of EVD was recorded in WA on June 
21, 2014, and the last case died at the Ebola treatment center on 
August 11, 2015. During this period, a total of 3,838 confirmed 
cases and 32,706 contacts were reported in WA and listed in the 
VHF database (Table 2). The epidemic peaked in mid-November 
2014, followed by a steep decline until April 2015.
The majority of the contacts in WA (more than 80%) were 
below 35 years of age, with the age groups 6–15 years (23.0%), 
16–25 years (25.6%), and 26–35 years (17.9%) constituting the 
most affected people. The age distributions of contacts were 
similar in both districts. The youngest contact was 4 days old, 
the oldest was 109 years, and the mean age was 22.7 years. Just 
under half of the contacts (49.1%) were male, while females 
accounted for 50.9% (Table 3). Overall in WA, more than half 
of the contacts (52.5%) were neighbors of the confirmed case 
for which they were listed as contact, while 37.9% were family 
members. This trend is different between the two districts. In WA 
urban district, the majority of contacts (63.2%) were neighbors, 
whereas in the rural district, the majority (57.0%) were family 
members (Figure 1).
Western Area urban district accounted for the majority of con-
firmed cases (65.0%) and contacts (63.9%). In total, 852 (22.1%) 
of confirmed cases were reported to have come from the listed 
contacts, at the time of detection. Only 714 (18.6%) of confirmed 
cases had contacts directly linked to them in the EVD database. 
About half of all the listed contacts (49.0%, 16,042) were linked 
to the 714 confirmed cases (Table 2); the rest of the contacts were 
not directly linked to any confirmed cases in the EVD database. 
Based on the total number of listed confirmed cases and contacts, 
the mean number of contacts per case was 8.5. The mean number 
of contacts per case in WA urban district was twice that of the 
rural district (Table 2). The mean number of contacts per case 
ranged from 10 to 19 between June 2014 and May 2015; this rose 
significantly to 61 and 231, respectively, in June and July 2015 
(Figure 2). The proportion of new EVD cases who were known 
contacts in WA fluctuated between 0.0 and 48.0% during the 
outbreak (Figure 3).
The most common type of exposure was direct physical con-
tact with a living or dead body of a case (27.7%), sleeping, eating, 
or spending time with a case in the same room or household 
(11.9%), and multiple exposure that combined touching of body 
fluids, physical contact, touching linen, and eating/spending time 
together in the same room (25.1%). Touching body fluids and 
linen used by a case accounted for only 0.7 and 4.3% of exposures, 
respectively (Table 3).
Ten key informants were interviewed, including five contact 
tracers and five contact tracer supervisors. The majority of the 
interviewees mentioned timely identification of contacts who 
became cases as the main achievement in contact tracing. Many 
respondents reported that only up to 10.0% of the contacts 
monitored developed symptoms and became confirmed cases. 
One contact tracer summarized their success as “we were able 
to finish the Ebola battle.” Stigmatization and hostility to contact 
tracers, withholding of critical information on the status of 
contacts, provision of incorrect personal details, such as the 
name, address, and exposure of contacts, were identified as key 
challenges faced by contact tracers. “Community trust was hard 
to gain” reported one contact tracer. Many of the interviewees 
also mentioned late or irregular supply of food and water to 
contacts in quarantined homes as a challenge, which contributed 
to community resistance (Table 4). Almost all the interviewees 
agreed that community quarantining facilitated their work as 
contact tracers.
The majority of the interviewees indicated that provision 
of appropriate supplies and equipment, such as thermometers, 
hand sanitizers, rain boots, and rain coats, to contact tracers 
FigUre 1 | relationship of eVD contacts to cases in Western area, sierra leone: June 2014 to august 2015 (N = 22,469).
TaBle 3 | Demographic and exposure characteristics of eVD contacts in Western area districts, sierra leone: June 2014 to august 2015.
contact 
characteristics
age category Urban (%) rural (%) Total of  
Wa (%)
remarks
Age  
categories  
(years)
0–5 2,066 (13.1) 1,307 (14.5) 4,328 (13.9) 7,954 records excluded from the disaggregated 
data and 1,643 from the WA data6–15 3,663 (23.2) 2,168 (24.1) 7,427 (23)
16–25 4,178 (26.5) 2,227 (24.8) 7,960 (25.6)
26–35 2,916 (18.5) 1,561 (17.4) 5,559 (17.9)
36–45 1,504 (9.5) 854 (9.5) 2,949 (9.5)
46–55 736 (4.7) 461 (5.1) 1,470 (4.7)
55 and over 698 (4.4) 413 (4.6) 1,370 (4.4)
Mean 23 22.8 22.7 7,906 records excluded from the disaggregated 
data and 1,641 from the WA dataMode 25 25 25
Range 109 109 109
Gender Male 8,055 (49.6) 4,496 (49.1) 15,914 (49.1) 7,306 records excluded from the disaggregated 
data and 278 from the WA dataFemale 8,193 (50.4) 4,656 (50.9) 16,514 (50.9)
Type of  
exposure
Touched body fluids of case (1) 123 (0.9) 29 (0.4) 163 (0.7) 11,925 records excluded from the 
disaggregated data and 10,614 from the WA 
data
Had direct physical contact with 
body of case (dead or alive) (2)
4,814 (34.9) 1,210 (17.3) 6,121 (27.7)
Touched or shared the linen, clothes, 
or dishes/eating utensils of case (3)
816 (5.9) 85 (1.2) 954(4.3)
Slept, ate, or spent time in the same 
household or room as the case (4)
1,973 (14.3) 474 (6.8) 2,627 (11.9)
Combined (1) and (2) 1,134 (8.2) 247 (3.5) 1,397 (6.3)
Combined (1), (2), and (3) 277 (2.0) 394 (5.6) 730 (3.3)
Combined (1), (2), (3), and (4) 2,371 (17.2) 2,717 (38.8) 5,553 (25.1%)
Combined (1), (2), and (4) 86 (0.6) 16 (0.2) 107 (0.5)
Combined (1) and (3) 14 (0.1) 5 (0.1) 21 (0.1)
Combined (1), (3), and (4) 28 (0.2) 60 (0.9) 97 (0.4)
Combined (1) and (4) 61 (0.4) 7 (0.1) 68 (0.3)
Combined (2) and (3) 364 (2.6) 183 (2.6) 607 (2.7)
Combined (2), (3), and (4) 630 (4.6) 768 (11.0) 1,542 (7)
Combined (2) and (4) 455 (3.3) 108 (1.5) 602 (2.7)
Combined (3) and (4) 628 (4.6) 706 (10.1) 1,503 (6.8)
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would improve the contact tracing process during future 
outbreaks. One contact tracer remarked that “the government 
should provide basic equipment and logistics to contact tracers.” 
Many of the interviewees were of the opinion that better criteria 
for selection of contact tracers would ensure selection of good 
contact tracers and improve the quality of contact tracing. The 
interviewees proposed the following criteria for the selection 
of contact tracers: level of education, membership of the local 
FigUre 3 | Proportion (%) of new eVD cases who were known contacts in Wa, sierra leone: June 2014 to august 2015.
FigUre 2 | Mean number of eVD contacts per case each month in Wa, sierra leone: June 2014 to november 2015.
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community, and some background in health. Many of the inter-
viewees also emphasized the importance of ensuring that the 
selection process is devoid of political interference. One contact 
tracer said “a contact tracer should be selected and trained at 
the ward level,” while another said “let them work within their 
own communities and let there be no political interest.” Many of 
the interviewees also mentioned provision of adequate training 
and regular retraining of contact tracers, provision of means 
of transportation, better remuneration for contact tracers, and 
more regular supply of food and water to quarantined homes 
as ways to improve contact tracing in future outbreaks. One 
contact tracer said contact tracers should be “provided with 
feedback on the cases they identify and send to holding centers” 
(Table 4).
DiscUssiOn
Ebola virus disease outbreaks constitute major threats to global 
health security. Efficient and effective contact tracing, coupled 
with timely isolation of those who become symptomatic, is critical 
in limiting the spread and containing an outbreak. Until recently, 
EVD contact tracing had been confined to rural settings,7 where 
identification, listing, and follow-up of contacts was relatively 
easy (10). Transmission of EVD in urban settings (including a 
capital city), such as WA during the 2014/15 outbreak, presented 
new challenges (11) and realities, which would inform contact 
7 WHO Ebola virus disease factsheet no 103. WHO. (2016) http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/factsheets/fs103/en/ [Accessed on March 27, 2016].
TaBle 4 | summary of key information interviews: main achievements, 
challenges, and recommendations for improving eVD contact tracing in 
Western area districts, sierra leone.
Key findings Frequency
Successes 
achieved
Timely identification of contacts who became 
cases
9/10
Estimated percentage of contacts who 
developed symptoms (%)
0–10 4/10
11–20 1/10
21–30 1/10
More than 30 1/10
Challenges 
experienced
Stigmatization and hostility toward contact 
tracers
6/10
Provision of wrong information about names 
and address and withholding of critical 
information on contacts
5/10
Late or irregular supply of food and water to 
quarantined contacts
4/10
How to 
improve 
contact 
tracing
Ensure provision of appropriate supplies and 
equipment to contact tracers
7/10
Better selection criteria for contact tracers 5/10
Improve training, regular retraining and 
reorientation of contact tracers
4/10
Provision of means of transport and 
communication and better remuneration of 
contact tracers
4/10
Improved food and water supply to 
quarantined homes
2/10
Improved data contact tracing data 
transmission using mobile technology
1/10
Quarantine 
to contact 
tracing
Community quarantining facilitated their work 
as contact tracers
8/10
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tracing strategy development in future outbreaks. It is therefore 
pertinent to understand the dynamics and challenges associated 
with contact tracing, especially in urban settings.
This study highlights weaknesses that were inherent in the 
quality and effectiveness of contact tracing activities in WA dur-
ing the EVD outbreak. The findings of the study show that more 
than 75.0% of the new cases in WA were not listed as contacts at 
the time of their illness, and only 18.6% of confirmed cases in 
the database were linked to contacts; the proportion of identi-
fied contacts linked to cases was <50%. These poor indicators 
of performance of contact tracing activities demonstrate that 
contact identification and listing was neither comprehensive nor 
exhaustive. The missed EVD contacts are potential new chains of 
transmission, which may have contributed to the sustained trans-
mission of EVD in WA (8). We identified provision of incorrect 
personal identity, lack of community trust in EVD prevention and 
control interventions (resulting in community resistance), and 
withholding of vital information on potential contacts and their 
health status as the challenges responsible for this trend; these 
findings are similar to those of other studies on contact tracing. 
Greiner et al. and Dixon et al. identified community mispercep-
tion, fear, stigma, provision of incorrect personal identity, and the 
need to continue financial and social transactions as challenges to 
effective contact tracing (7, 8).
Perhaps, one of the most important factors associated with the 
inability to list all contacts is the stigma associated with being 
listed as a contact (7, 8). “Sometimes they drove us out of their 
houses or just ran away on seeing us” said one of the key informant 
interviewees. This results in movement of contacts to areas where 
they are unknown, therefore establishing multiple foci for trans-
mission. The age distribution of the contacts shows that most of 
them belong to the economically productive age group. Although 
most of the key informant interviewees said that the quarantine 
policy facilitated their work, the policy may have prevented the 
productive age group from engaging in economic activities for 
at least 21  days, which is another disincentive for being listed 
as a contact (7, 8). In communities such as those in WA, where 
poverty levels are high (estimated to be 70.0%),8 it is important to 
provide for the needs of contacts of EVD cases during the period 
of monitoring and confinement, to encourage cooperation and 
collaboration from affected communities (12).
The overall mean number of contacts per patient recorded in 
this outbreak (8.5 contacts per patient) falls short of what was 
obtained in similar settings, such as Lagos, Nigeria (22.6 contacts 
per patient), Port Harcourt, Nigeria (133 contacts per patient), 
and Pujehun, Sierra Leone (11.5–25 contacts per patient) (13, 
14), which further suggests underreporting of contacts. Given the 
very high population density in the urban slums and informal 
settlements of WA, we believe that the mean contacts per patient 
should have been much higher. In the Ebola outbreak in Nigeria, 
contact identification and listing was comprehensive, and over 
95% of contacts were followed up on a daily basis. As a result, any 
contact who developed symptoms was isolated from the com-
munity immediately, and this contributed to the timely control 
of the EVD outbreak in that country. Perhaps, this was possible 
because of the limited magnitude of the outbreak, and the highly 
trained staff that implemented contact tracing.
In WA, the huge number of confirmed cases (and contacts) 
overwhelmed the EVD contact tracing system; the limited 
number of contact tracers could not cope with the workload, 
and this compromised the quality of the contact tracing process. 
Unpublished observations of contact tracing practices and 
reports during the outbreak showed that massive recruitment 
of contact tracers, which was fraught with political interference, 
recruitment of unsuitable (and often unmotivated contact trac-
ers), and inability to agree on standardized procedures for contact 
tracing also compromised the quality of contact tracing practices 
in WA. For instance, the use of thermometers by contact tracers 
was widely debated at the national and district levels but never 
finally agreed upon, and therefore this practice was not uniformly 
applied in all areas.
In this study, the proportion of male contacts is almost equal 
to those who were female, which is similar to the findings from 
a similar study in Guinea (8). Regarding the relationship of the 
contacts to their source cases, neighbors comprised the highest 
percentage of contacts, followed by family members. However, 
a different pattern was observed between the urban and rural 
districts. In the rural district, the majority of the contacts (57.0%) 
8 Acaps Sierra Leone Country Profile. Acaps. (2012) http://www.acaps.org/img/
documents/c-acaps-country-profile-sierra-leone.pdf [Accessed on March 27, 2016].
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were family members, while in the urban district, the majority 
(63.2%) were neighbors; these findings are similar to those of a 
contact tracing study in Guinea, where more than 50% of contacts 
in a rural area were observed to be family members of the source 
patients (8). This could be explained by social norms of the Sierra 
Leonean society, where families often live together (in family 
compounds) in rural areas, but not in urban areas. This finding 
should better inform contact identification and listing during 
future outbreaks in urban settings.
Physical contact with the body of a patient (dead or alive) 
and sleeping, eating, or spending time with patients were the 
most common types of contact exposure in WA; this finding 
is similar to that of other setting (13). In Sierra Leonean com-
munities, taking care of sick relatives, friends, and neighbors and 
participation in funeral rituals involving touching dead bodies 
are widely practiced. These could have accounted for this trend. 
This highlights the importance of safe and dignified burial as a 
critical intervention in the control of EVD.
The sharp increase in the number of contacts per case reported 
in June/July 2015 was attributed to the additional measures of 
quarantining an area with a newly confirmed case, which was 
undertaken by national authorities at the height of the outbreak. 
This enabled monitoring of the whole population under quaran-
tine in order to prevent potentially unidentified high-risk contacts 
from escaping to another district. There was no clear trend in the 
number of new EVD cases who were known contacts during the 
study period. Normally, this number increases as the quality of 
contact tracing improves over time, which again highlights weak-
nesses in contact identification and tracing in WA.
This study also revealed weaknesses in the EVD contact data-
base management system. Ideally, every contact must be linked 
to a source case; however, in this study, several contact listing 
forms had missing information on many variables, and 51.0% of 
the contacts were not linked to their source patient. Only 56.8% 
of urban contacts and 34.3% of rural contacts were linked to a 
source case, while more than 80% of confirmed cases had no 
linked contact in the EVD contact database. This is a potential 
challenge for effective monitoring of the contact tracing compo-
nent of the EVD outbreak response. Furthermore, our findings 
showed no evidence for the use of the contact tracing database 
for decision making.
study limitations
This study is subject to three main limitations. The first is the 
incompleteness and quality of the VHF database; a significant 
proportion of the confirmed cases were not linked to specific 
contacts. Furthermore, some of the records had missing informa-
tion on important variables, such as residence and relationship of 
contact to case values, which made disaggregation of the data by 
district challenging. Some of the values for variables, such as age, 
had outliers that were not possible. This limitation raised poten-
tial data quality and validity challenges, which we addressed by 
cleaning the database and excluding records with incomplete or 
outlying data and contacts who were not linked to any confirmed 
case in the database.
The second limitation was associated with the interviewer bias 
during the key informant interviews. The involvement of many of 
the authors in the organization, supervision, and monitoring of 
contact tracing activities at various times may have introduced 
bias into these interviews, as they may have only focused on 
information that confirmed their predetermined perceptions. 
To address the problem of interviewer bias, the key informant 
interviewers were carefully selected from among the authors and 
appropriately trained on how to conduct the interviews.
The third limitation is interviewee bias, which is an intrinsic 
limitation of key informant interviews. The key informants may 
have preconceived perceptions of what the interviewers wanted 
to hear. To reduce this limitation, we ensured careful selection 
of key informants, taking into consideration factors, such as age, 
gender, education level, religion, ethnicity, and areas of assign-
ment. Furthermore, their responses were cross checked with 
findings of available reports on lessons learnt on contact tracing 
in WA.
cOnclUsiOn
Although achievements were recorded in contact tracing in WA 
during the study period, several challenges constraining effective 
contact tracing were observed. Our findings confirm the results 
of other studies (7, 12, 15) and identified incomplete identifica-
tion and listing of contacts, due to a lack of disclosure of contact 
identification and history and inconsistent contact follow-up 
methods resulting in failure to reach and effectively monitor all 
contacts regularly, as critical challenges facing contact tracers. 
Inappropriate selection criteria and inadequate refresher training 
of contact tracers and lack of reliable contact tracing data were also 
identified as challenges impeding timely control of the outbreak in 
the WA of Sierra Leone. Our study also shows that in rural areas, 
family members are more likely to be contacts, while in urban 
areas, neighbors are more likely to be contacts. Furthermore, 
our findings demonstrate that physical contact with the body of 
patients (dead or alive) and sleeping, eating, or spending time 
with patients are the most plausible type of contact exposure. 
These findings shed more light on the dynamics of contact tracing 
and provide evidence that would inform more effective contact 
identification and listing during future outbreaks.
Based on our findings, we propose five main recommenda-
tions aimed at improving contact tracing during future outbreaks. 
First, establishment of appropriate mechanisms for selection 
of the right contact tracers, from local communities, would 
improve the quality of contact tracing. In this regard, mobiliza-
tion, engagement, and participation of local communities in 
contact tracing activities should be encouraged (16) to obtain 
community collaboration, which would reduce resistance and 
facilitate voluntary provision of contact tracing information. 
This in turn would facilitate more comprehensive identification 
of contacts. Furthermore, participation of community leaders in 
the identification and listing of contacts should be encouraged 
as a means to facilitate more comprehensive listing of contacts. 
Second, provision of adequate training, retraining, and supervi-
sion of contact tracers is critical to ensure sustained quality of 
contact tracing interventions. Contact tracing methodology, 
interpersonal communication, and community engagement 
skills should be included in the standard package of such training. 
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Third, establishment of a well-managed and complete contact 
tracing database, early in the course of an EVD outbreak would 
provide reliable data, which could then be used to monitor and 
evaluate the quality of contact tracing as well as guiding contact 
tracing decision-making. Fourth, timely provision of the neces-
sary supplies, equipment, and means of transportation would be 
a good incentive to contact tracers. To facilitate this, guidance 
on the appropriate items, which should be adapted to the local 
context, should be adopted early in the response to improve the 
quality of contact tracing. Finally, in scenarios where contacts will 
be quarantined, it is important to cater for their basic needs, to 
encourage their collaboration and participation.
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